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Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP. In the first meeting, Mao Zedong delivered his speech "Cast away illusion, prepare for struggle," which mainly dealt with relations with the United States, emphasizing that the possibility of American armed intervention on behalf of the KMT should be taken into full account so the CCP would not be caught unprepared if the United States entered the Chinese civil war.9 It was in early 1949 that Mao decided to abandon his hope of balancing American and Soviet influence and began to "lean to one side," towards the Soviet Union, and to seek the economic and military aid that he badly needed from Moscow.l?
Stalin cautioned Mao Zedong not to embark on any large-scale military operation, such as crossing the Yangtze to defeat Chiang's troops, for fear that America might intewene to save Chiang.ll Mao, however, did not agree, and he believed that if such a possibility did arise, the United States could be defeated.l2 In Mao's view, if Truman wanted to conquer the CCP, he would need at least one or two million troops which he was unable to spare then.l3 In April 1949, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the Yangtze river and seized Nanjing.
On 30 June 1949, Chairman Mao delivered his famous speech "On the people's democratic dictatorship." He denounced the United States as an imperialistic power seeking to dominate China and announced that China would now "lean to the side" of the Soviet Union.l4 Not long after that, the American ambassador, Leighton Stuart, left Nanking for the United States on 2 August 1949, and the State Department published its 1054-page White Paper on China three days later.l5
Immediately after its policy towards American and the Soviet Union was decided, the CCP waged an anti-imperialist campaign against the United States.l6 The newly established government set out to humiliate the United States by expressing its defiance of established foreign privileges in China. In so doing, it reflected a national attitude, or mood, deeply rooted in China's modern history. At the same time, Mao Zedong initiated a nationwide criticism of Washington's China White Paper, and he himself wrote five articles for the Xinhua News Agency, criticizing United States China policy, dispelling some people's illusion about Americans, and helped the whole Party prepare mentally for a possible confrontation with the United States.
It should be noted that the CCP did not hope for American military intervention. In Mao's strategic planning, the first priority was to avoid such a prospectl7; and if it failed the next was to prepare for it. For this purpose, the CCP leadership decided to take the following measures in the final stage of the liberation war:
1. To speed up the process of the war so as to lessen the chances of America's intervention. Immediately after the three great campaigns which annihilated Chiang's main forces north of the Yangtze river, Mao Zedong ordered the Third and Second Field Armies to prepare for crossing the Yangtze.l8 Mao seemed to believe that the PLA must move at top speed to pursue the remnant KMT forces and completely wipe out the KMT forces in the whole country before the United States made up its mind. The aim, according to the directive of the CCP's military commission in May of 1949, was also to occupy the big sea-port cities which might be used by America as an excuse for intervention.l9 For this purpose, the PLA's strategic plan, after crossing the Yangtze river, was to advance southeastward first and then southwestward. Within the half year, this objective was achieved, and Shanghai, Qingdao, Fuzhou and Guangzhou were captured. By April 1950, all of the mainland except Tibet was brought under the CCP's control. Meanwhile, CCP leaders began to organize an air force and a navy in preparation for liberating Taiwan.20 2. Mao Zedong also decided to use an unusually large number of forces in a major campaign as a deterrent as well as a precaution against any American intervention. Mao ordered more than one million men to wage the Yangtze campaign against KMT forces which were numerically much inferior. The Second Field Army was actually designated as the unit to meet the possible American military intervention.2l After sweeping the KMT main forces off the mainland, the CCP stationed massive troops in the area of Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangzhou, three coastal metropolitan areas that were most vulnerable and most possible for the United States to attack; and 
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After United Nations forces recaptured Seoul, the Indian prime minister, Nehru, told Chinese leaders that the three (western) foreign ministers' meeting had reached an agreement not to cross the 38th parallel, and that any further advance northwards would have to be decided by the United Nations.50 Soon after, Ernest Bevin the British foreign minister, indicated through Nehru to the Chinese that the United Nations forces would stop 40 miles away from the Yalu river if they were to cross the 38th parallel.5l Since the United States had twice gone back on its word passed on through India, Chinese leaders had reason to believe that the American pledge of not attacking China would be another trick. Zhou Enlai viewed American policy in the following way:
By using the bases in Japan, the United States inherited the adventurism of the Japanese militarists, following the history since the war of 1895 and took the track of conquering China, namelyS to occupy North-east China before annexing China and to occupy Korea before grabbing North-east China....-For us, the Korean question is not simply a question concerning Korea, it is related to the Taiwan issue. The US imperialists have adopted a hostile attitude towards us and set up their defence line in the Taiwan Strait while paying lip service to non-aggression and non-intervention.52 From the information we got, they wanted to calm China first and after occupying North Korea) they will come to attack China.53
It was natural that Mao's greatest concern was the physical security of the newly established regime, and that he was especially worried 48 First, it was noted at the meeting that America had emerged from the Second World War as the most powerful country in the world. Its annual output of steel in 1949 reached 87 72 million tons, more than 144 times that of China in the same year. The gap between the two countries in electricity, petroleum, other industrial products and grain was even greater.63 China's agriculture and industry were still recovering, and could barely meet peaceful domestic needs, let alone the needs of a long and large-scale war.
Secondly, America was then the only country in the world possessing atomic bombs. Its air and naval dominance was overwhelming, and its war resources seemed inexhaustible. Though the PLA was numerically superior, a large number of its troops were pinned down all over the country. The strategic reserve forces that could be used were limited. The PLA was still using weapons and equipment captured from the KMT and the Japanese. Its firepower on the ground alone was inferior to America's. In 1950, one PLA corps had 198 artillery pieces, barely more than one tenth of those possessed by a similar American unit (1428), and even fewer than half those of an American division (476).64 Moreover, the PLA was battle fatigued after four years of civil war without adequate rest and training.
Thirdly, the mainland was newly liberated, with the new regime still being established at the grassroots, and a great number of areas were undergoing land reform. Though the KMT's main forces had been defeated on the mainland, its remnants frequently harassed and raided the local governments. Some leaders at the meeting asserted that for China the major threat was from Taiwan, not Korea.
Mao Zedong agreed at the meeting that the three disadvantages discussed did exist, but said: "What you have said sounds reasonable. But it would be shameful for us to stand by seeing our neighbours in perilous danger without offering any help."65 To Mao's mind, if China stood by when North Korea was in peril; then the Soviet Union could also stand by when China was in peril; and "Internationalism would be empty talk."66 Also, he believed that there were some advantages to China in dispatching troops to Korea. He then made a strategic analysis of the situation.
First, Mao believed that a major direct Sino-American confrontation was inevitable. After Truman's announcement that he was dispatching the 7th Fleet to protect Chiang, and after MacArthur's belligerent remarks against China, Mao was more than ever convinced that such a confrontation was a matter of time.67 He then pointed out three probable fronts where he thought America was poised to stage attacks on China: Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan. The first of these was a more favourable battlefield for China than the last two, because of its short distance from the Soviet Union and the industrial centre of China. If China let Korea become a hostile neighbour, a large number of China's forces and resources would have to be stationed indefinitely along the 1,000-mile-long border.
Zhou Enlai later explained Mao's thinking to the CPV's highranking officials:
With the decisive duel between China and the US imperialists being inevitable, the question is where to do it; of course it is decided by the imperialists, but in some sense, also by us. Korea as a battleground chosen by the imperialists is favourable to us.... Looking at three battlefronts, it is easy to understand that it would be much more difficult to wage a war against America in Vietnam, not to mention on the offshore islands, than here [Korea]. Here, we have the most favourable terrain, the closest communication to China, the most convenient material and manpower back-up . . . and the most convenient way for us to get indirect Soviet support.68 Allen Whiting, when discussing China's motivation to enter the war, emphasized several Chinese interests and goals, including the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, the enhancement of China's status in Asia and the reversal in United States-Japanese relations.69 According to the Chinese sources available, these were considered by the Chinese leaders in making their decision but were less important factors. Mao was forced to enter the war by the situation created by the United States Government. His decision was based on a choice of the least dangerous of his limited options.
Were Truman's promises that United Nations forces would stop at the Yalu river and take no provocative action against China reliable? Everyone at the meeting doubted that they were since America had already broken its previous promise -which had been solemnly 65 But what advantages would China gain in fighting the most powerful country in the world? This was the most hotly debated question at the meeting. Mao and General Peng Dehuai put forward compelling arguments. In sum, they amounted to the following points:
1. Korea was the weak point in America's global strategy. It was pointed out that, though the United States was pursuing a strategy of global containment of communism, its strategic priority still lay in Europe, the Soviet Union being its main rival. Its military deployment in 49 countries made its already inadequate military forces even more thinly spread. The war in Korea would serve to disrupt America's strategic priorities and over-extend its defence line. It could not afford to fight a protracted war in Korea which would make its illbalanced strategy even worse.70 Besides American limited manpower, its low morale and the reluctance of its allies to be drawn in would also be advantageous to China.7l 2. The atomic bomb had limitations. The scarcity of atomic bombs meant that it would be hard for Truman to use them in a peripheral area since they had been originally intended primarily to check the Soviet Union. If the bombs were used against China, the bombs' effects would be limitedby China's vast size andthinlyspreadpopulation. InKorea, it would be even more difficult to use the atomic bomb since the hostile forces would be so close to each other. In addition, Soviet knowledge of the atomic bomb also reduced the fear of the Chinese leaders.72
Although Chinese leaders regarded the atomic bomb as a paper tiger, they did seriously weigh the consequences of its use. Allen Whiting inferred that "it may be that Soviet Union strategic estimates led the Chinese Communist analysts to recognize the possibility of a U.S. atomic attack but to underestimate its consequences."73 In fact, the Soviet Union's estimate of the bomb did not have much influence on Chinese leaders; they made their own estimate from a purely Chinese perspective.
3. There was a geographical advantage. The narrow shape of the Korean peninsula and the mountainous area in North Korea would greatly limit the mobility of MacArthur's mechanized forces and ground firepower, and it would be advantageous for China in conducting defensive actions. Though MacArthur could get part of his logistic support from Japan, the greater part of his supplies would have to be transported from America-more than 10,000 miles away. By comparison, China's supply route from home, and from the Soviet Union, would be much shorter. Moreover, MacArthur's arrogance and underestimation of China's capability of intervening, his shortage of manpower and the lack of effective co-ordination of United Nations forces were also thought to create conditions advantageous to China, if she were to stage a surprise attack.
In predicting the course of the war, one participant gave three different possibilities:
( 1) our neighbour goes into war while peace is maintained in our country; (2) our neighbour goes into war while the enemy bombs our country; (3) our neighbour goes into war while the enemy lands its troops on our coast and the whole country is involved in the war. For the time being, our policy is based on the second scenario.75
The worst case, Mao believed, would be that the CPV could not destroy the enemy troops in Korea and the Americans would declare a full-scale war against China. Then the recovery of the national economy would be delayed and people would suffer for a period of time. However, many CCP leaders believed that it was necessary to make some sacrifices for the sake of the long-term national interest. As General Peng Dehuai stated on S October, "it is necessary to dispatch troops to Korea. If China is devastated in war, it only means that the liberation war against the KMT will last a few years longer."76 Therefore, it was logical that the CCP leaders selected Korea as the place to fight against the United States, believing as they did that the Truman Administration had taken the first step in invading China from three directions: Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.77
On 2 October, Mao Zedong decided that China should send a force across the Yalu river to support the DPRK, and suggested that: There was a consensus among the top Chinese leaders that the outcome of the initial CPV operation would have a great impact on the morale and confidence of both the army at the front and the people at home. Chinese strategic planning for the war was based on the assumption that the war might be confined to Korea, with some bombardment of the Chinese homeland.93
With the help of General Peng, Mao made several decisions on the initial operational planning which proved crucial to the subsequent development of the Korean War:
1. On the force size. Stalin first advised Mao Zedong to deploy only six divisions in the initial stage of the war, for fear that a force larger than that would provoke America to escalate the war beyond control and to use the atomic bomb.94
After a careful study of the situation, Mao and Peng doubted the wisdom of the advice. The United Nations force numbered 14 divisions and two brigades (440,000); its first echelon contained 130,000 troops. The CPV would be outnumbered if it followed Stalin's advice, and it would surely be outgunned. Peng was worried that after the first engagement the Yalu river bridges would be demolished and reinforcements might be difEcult to send across it. Mao and Peng reached the same conclusion, that all six corps (18 divisions) in the border area must be deployed into Korea to achieve numerical superiority there and assure victory in the initial engagements.95 In fact, the first entrance of Chinese troops was made by four full-sized corps and three artillery divisions, totalling 25O,OOO96 2. The secret force deployment. Mao instructed Peng on the eve of crossing the Yalu that surprise would be a decisive factor in achieving initial victory. Though MacArthur had the means to conduct reconnaisssance, his arrogance and complacency prevented objective analysis of the information he got. Surprise could be achieved both because of his miscalculation of China's intention to intervene and the well-disguised Chinese force deployment. The surprise factor was perfectly achieved. Not until the first largescale engagement had been made and his forces had been badly mauled, did MacArthur learn about the large size of the Chinese forces. After the first offensive operation was completed on 5 November 1950, the CPV suddenly disengaged from the United Nations forces. Why did Beijing not commit its full strength to an immediate all-out offensive against those forces? This is another mystery yet to be resolved in the west. Whiting considered several explanations: the need for a greater concentration of forces; the need for a protracted war; and political considerations regarding testing and examining the United Nations' response to China's intervention.l02
Considering the evidence Whiting then had, his analysis in some respects was well argued, but he overlooked the subtlety of traditional Chinese psychology in conducting war. We can gain a better understanding of this from Peng's later explanation. Peng said:
First, though we achieved success in the first offensive operation, the enemy's main force remained intact. With the main body of the CPV unexposed, it was expected that the enemy would continue to stage an offensive. Second, the enemy had boasted the ability of its airforce to cut off our communication and food supply. This gave us an opportunity to deceive the enemy about our intention. By releasing some POWs, we could give the enemy an impression that we are in short supply and are retreating. Thirdly, the enemy is equipped with air and tank cover, so it would be diiEcult for us to wipe out the retreating enemy on foot.l03
In other words, the aim of Peng's disengagement was to conceal his strength, deceive the enemy and prepare for harder blows on MacArthur.
During the three years of the Korean War, the Chinese sent in rotation altogether 25 field corps, 70 artillery divisions, 10 railway engineering divisions, three tank divisions, two public security divisions, 12 air force divisions and 1 5 engineering regiments into the Korean battlefield. The total number of CPV forces deployed was more than 2-3 million troops, including 66 per cent of the entire field army, 62 per cent of all artillery divisions, 100 per cent of all tank divisions, and 70 per cent of the entire air force that People's Republic of China had at that time.l04 The total casualties of the CPV in the Korean War were 360,000, excluding 20,000 people captured by the United Nations force.l05
Conclusion
China's decision to enter the Korean War was made in a risky and uncertain situation with a very complicated historical background. Some of the roots of the decision can be found in the history of modern China, but the relations between the CCP and the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations were more important in laying the groundwork for the decision. When Mao and Truman decided to enter the war, neither was fully prepared, and the consequences seemed uncertain for both of them. Mao had long been psychologically prepared for the possibility, but he certainly was under heavier pressure than Truman, for he was facing a far superior enemy. From the materials now available on the Chinese side, we can see that Chinese participation was neither a long-planned, well-designed operation, nor an action taken as part of the Soviet Union's global expansion. Stalin might have persuaded Mao not to take action if Mao had not reached the conclusion that a Sino-American confrontation was inevitable or if Truman had shown some flexibility in his policy when the CCP took over the mainland. Ideology played an important but not an absolute role in Mao's decision, contrary to the views of most western historians over the past three decades.
It should be noted that Whiting's comprehensive study of China's decision to enter the war, and some of his inferences and conclusions, were closer to the truth than those of most other western analysts. Considering the limited materials he had then from the Chinese side, probably no one could have done better than he did. But, as mentioned above, when analysing an action made by China, a country with a history unlike that of any other nation in the world, no single factor could be regarded as the roots or motivation behind it. In Whiting's book, it is not difficult to find evidence that he was deeply biased ideologically, and overlooked many important factors. He was influenced in his inferences by some key assumptions, such as the one that patron-client relations existed between Stalin and Mao; this certainly narrowed his angle of view and limited the possibilities he could explore.
From what we have discussed, it is fairly clear that the reasons why China entered the Korean War were primarily security concerns. 
